On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

被引：0

作者：

Abbate, C. E. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Nevada, Dept Philosophy, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHIA | 2020年 / 48卷 / 04期

关键词：

Blame; Moral ignorance; Consequentialism;

D O I：

10.1007/s11406-019-00163-8

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Moralignorance is always blameworthy, but "failing to realize" that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.

引用

页码：1355 / 1362

页数：8

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