Strategic delegation in an experimental mixed duopoly

被引：11

作者：

Du, Ninghua ^{[1
,2
]}

Heywood, John S. ^{[3
]}

Ye, Guangliang ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, PR, Peoples R China

[2] Minist Educ, Key Lab Math Econ SUFE, Shanghai 200433, PR, Peoples R China

[3] Univ Wisconsin Milwaukee, Dept Econ, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA

[4] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Hanqing Adv Inst Econ & Finance, Beijing 100872, PR, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2013年 / 87卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Mixed duopoly; Incentive contract; Experiment markets; NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING THEORY; OLIGOPOLY; INCENTIVES; FIRMS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We provide the first experimental test of the consequences of delegation in a mixed duopoly. Such delegation allows a profit maximizing private owner and a welfare maximizing public owner to weight sales in managerial contracts. Theory predicts that such contracts improve welfare. Our evidence indicates that both public and private subject owners do provide a weight on sales consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium. Critically, however, this emerges in the experiment only when playing with a robot manager and when playing with a human subject manager after the experience of playing with a robot manager. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：91 / 100

页数：10

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