Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

被引:90
|
作者
Song, Zheng [1 ]
Storesletten, Kjetil [2 ]
Zilibotti, Fabrizio [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] Univ Oslo, Dept Econ, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
[3] Univ Zurich, Dept Econ, CH-8008 Zurich, Switzerland
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Fiscal policy; general equilibrium; government debt; intergenerational conflict; Markov equilibrium; political economy; public goods; repeated voting; small open economies; GOVERNMENT DEBT; DEFICITS; TAXATION; POLICY; TIME; ECONOMY;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA8910
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces fiscal discipline, that is, low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some salient features of fiscal policy in modern economies.
引用
收藏
页码:2785 / 2803
页数:19
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