Markov-Perfect Rent Dissipation in Rights-Based Fisheries

被引:8
|
作者
Valcu, Adriana [1 ]
Weninger, Quinn [1 ]
机构
[1] Iowa State Univ, Dept Econ, Ames, IA 50011 USA
关键词
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium; individual transferable quotas; production externalities; resource rent; MODELS; GAMES;
D O I
10.5950/0738-1360-28.2.111
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present a general dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition, and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological, and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. We offer new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.
引用
下载
收藏
页码:111 / 131
页数:21
相关论文
共 50 条