Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and CEO luck: are lucky CEOs socially responsible?

被引:16
|
作者
Jiraporn, P. [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Chintrakarn, P. [5 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Sch Grad Profess Studies, Malvern, PA 19355 USA
[2] Thammasat Univ, Bangkok, Thailand
[3] Mahidol Univ, Coll Management, Bangkok 10700, Thailand
[4] NIDA, Fac Business Adm, Bangkok, Thailand
[5] MUIC, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand
关键词
corporate social responsibility; lucky CEOs; option backdating; agency theory; G30; G34;
D O I
10.1080/13504851.2013.772291
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Lucky' CEOs are given stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing, severe agency problems and poor corporate governance. We find that lucky (opportunistic) CEOs invest significantly less in CSR. The evidence thus does not support the notion that CSR is primarily used to enhance managers' private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Rather, lucky CEOs appear to view CSR investments as depriving them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit.
引用
收藏
页码:1036 / 1039
页数:4
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