Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

被引：6

作者：

Ray, Indrajit ^{[1
]}

Snyder, Susan ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Birmingham, Dept Econ, Birmingham B15 2TT, W Midlands, England

[2] Minnesota Dept Human Serv, Reports & Forecasts Div, St Paul, MN 55164 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 49卷 / 06期

关键词：

Revealed preference; Consistency; Subgame-perfect equilibrium; TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS; COLLECTIVE CHOICE; RATIONALIZABILITY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：471 / 477

页数：7

共 50 条

[41] Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection in observable queues
Hassin, R
Haviv, M
[J]. ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2002, 113 (1-4) : 15 - 26
[42] Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfection in Observable Queues
Refael Hassin
Moshe Haviv
[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2002, 113 : 15 - 26
[43] UPPER HEMICONTINUITY OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
BORGERS, T
[J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1991, 20 (01) : 89 - 106
[44] Discounted Repeated Games Having Computable Strategies with No Computable Best Response under Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
Dargaj, Jakub
Simonsen, Jakob Grue
[J]. ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, 2022, 10 (01)
[45] Subgame-perfect cooperative agreements in a dynamic game of climate change
Chander, Parkash
[J]. JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 2017, 84 : 173 - 188
[46] The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
Sertel, MR
Yilmaz, B
[J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1999, 16 (04) : 615 - 627
[47] The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
Murat R. Sertel
Bilge Yılmaz
[J]. Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, 16 : 615 - 627
[48] Subgame perfect equilibria in stage games
Manelli, AM
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2002, 102 (02) : 480 - 484
[49] Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games
Mashiah-Yaakovi, Ayala
[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2014, 43 (01) : 89 - 135
[50] Subgame-perfect equilibrium in a two-stage monopoly market game
Eleanor T. von Ende
Klaus G. Becker
[J]. International Advances in Economic Research, 1997, 3 (3) : 328 - 328

← 1 2 3 4 5 →