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Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

被引：6
|
作者：
Ray, Indrajit [1 ]
Snyder, Susan [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Birmingham, Dept Econ, Birmingham B15 2TT, W Midlands, England
[2] Minnesota Dept Human Serv, Reports & Forecasts Div, St Paul, MN 55164 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 49卷 / 06期
关键词：
Revealed preference; Consistency; Subgame-perfect equilibrium; TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS; COLLECTIVE CHOICE; RATIONALIZABILITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：471 / 477
页数：7
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