Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems

被引：0
|
作者：
Beynier, Aurelie [1 ]
Chevaleyre, Yann [2 ]
Gourves, Laurent [2 ]
Lesca, Julien [2 ]
Maudet, Nicolas [1 ]
Wilczynski, Anaelle [2 ]
机构：
[1] Sorbonne Univ, CNRS, Lab Informat Paris 6, F-75005 Paris, France
[2] Univ Paris 09, PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Paris, France
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS (AAMAS' 18) | 2018年
关键词：
Object allocation; Envy-Freeness; Complexity; Algorithms;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
We study the fair division problem consisting in allocating one item per agent so as to avoid (or minimize) envy, in a setting where only agents connected in a given social network may experience envy. In a variant of the problem, agents themselves can be located on the network by the central authority. These problems turn out to be difficult even on very simple graph structures, but we identify several tractable cases. We further provide practical algorithms and experimental insights.
引用
收藏
页码：292 / 300
页数：9
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