Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets

被引：150

作者：

Duchin, Ran ^{[1
]}

Sosyura, Denis ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

[2] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2013年 / 68卷 / 02期

关键词：

CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; BOARD CONNECTIONS; AGENCY PROBLEMS; DARK SIDE; INVESTMENT; INCENTIVES; ALLOCATION; GOVERNANCE; BUSINESS;

D O I：

10.1111/jofi.12003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Using hand-collected data on divisional managers at S&P 500 firms, we study their role in internal capital budgeting. Divisional managers with social connections to the CEO receive more capital. Connections to the CEO outweigh measures of managers' formal influence, such as seniority and board membership, and affect both managerial appointments and capital allocations. The effect of connections on investment efficiency depends on the tradeoff between agency and information asymmetry. Under weak governance, connections reduce investment efficiency and firm value via favoritism. Under high information asymmetry, connections increase investment efficiency and firm value via information transfer.

引用

页码：387 / 429

页数：43

共 50 条

[31] INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL CAPITAL-MARKETS
GERTNER, RH
SCHARFSTEIN, DS
STEIN, JC
[J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04): : 1211 - 1230
[32] Internal control and internal capital allocation: evidence from internal capital markets of multi-segment firms
Ranjan D’Mello
Xinghua Gao
Yonghong Jia
[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, 2017, 22 : 251 - 287
[33] Incentives in internal capital markets: capital constraints, competition, and investment opportunities
Inderst, R
Laux, C
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2005, 36 (01): : 215 - 228
[34] Internal control and internal capital allocation: evidence from internal capital markets of multi-segment firms
D'Mello, Ranjan
Gao, Xinghua
Jia, Yonghong
[J]. REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES, 2017, 22 (01) : 251 - 287
[35] The internal workings of internal capital markets: Cross-country evidence
Gugler, Klaus
Peev, Evgeni
Segalla, Esther
[J]. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2013, 20 : 59 - 73
[36] Divisional managers' compensation to maximize spillovers and cooperation
Pandher, Gurupdesh S.
Vu, Joseph D.
[J]. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2018, 54 : 44 - 54
[37] DIVISIONAL COST OF CAPITAL - A PRACTICAL APPROACH
GUP, BE
NORWOOD, SW
[J]. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 1982, 11 (01) : 20 - 24
[38] Internal capital markets: Benefits, costs, and organizational arrangements
Liebeskind, JP
[J]. ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 2000, 11 (01) : 58 - 76
[39] Conglomerate Firms, Internal Capital Markets, and the Theory of the Firm
Maksimovic, Vojislav
Phillips, Gordon M.
[J]. ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, VOL 5, 2013, 5 : 225 - 244
[40] Internal capital markets and bank holding company efficiency
Bressan, Silvia
Rammerstorfert, Margarethe
Weinmayer, Karl
[J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2021, 39 (02) : 163 - 177

← 1 2 3 4 5 →