Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections

被引:32
|
作者
Luechinger, Simon [1 ,2 ]
Schaltegger, Christoph A. [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lucerne, Dept Econ, CH-6002 Luzern, Switzerland
[2] ETH, KOF Swiss Econ Inst, Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ St Gallen, St Gallen, Switzerland
关键词
Deficit projections; Deficits; Fiscal rules; Budget process; INSTITUTIONS; DISCIPLINE; INFERENCE; POLICY; DEBT; US;
D O I
10.1007/s10797-012-9245-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Fiscal rules are mentioned as instruments to commit political actors on long-term fiscal sustainability. However, fiscal rules may have stronger effects on projected than on realized fiscal outcomes because of window-dressing measures or because they alter the bargaining situation in the budget process. In our analysis for Swiss cantons, fiscal rules significantly lower the probability of projected and realized deficits with the former effect being twice as large. Projections are generally over-pessimistic but fiscal rules increase the probability of accurate projections. Thus, fiscal rules seem to substitute for finance ministers' over-pessimistic projections intended to reign in fellow ministers and legislatures (100 words).
引用
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页码:785 / 807
页数:23
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