CEO tenure and mergers and acquisitions

被引：20
|
作者：
Zhou, Bing [1 ]
Dutta, Shantanu [2 ]
Zhu, Pengcheng [3 ]
机构：
[1] Chongqing Technol & Business Univ, Res Ctr Econ Upper Reaches Yangtse River, Sch Accounting, 19 XueFu Ave, Chongqing 400067, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Ottawa, Telfer Sch Management, 55 Laurier East, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada
[3] Univ San Diego, Sch Business, 5998 Alcala Pk, San Diego, CA 92110 USA
来源：
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2020年 / 34卷
关键词：
CEO tenure; Mergers and acquisitions; Performance; Event study; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; DIRECTORS; CHOICE; BOARDS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.frl.2019.08.025
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO tenure and corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance. Using a large sample of 16,516 M&As in the United States between 1999 and 2015, we find that long-tenured CEOs tend to create more shareholder value than short-tenured CEOs in M&A deals. We also find that long-tenured CEOs are more likely to acquire private target firms and to make acquisitions in the same industries and the domestic market. Finally, we find that long-tenured CEOs receive higher compensation compared to the pre-acquisition period if they make better acquisitions.
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页数：11
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