Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism

被引:1111
|
作者
Graham, Jesse [1 ]
Haidt, Jonathan [2 ]
Koleva, Sena [1 ]
Motyl, Matt [3 ]
Iyer, Ravi [1 ]
Wojcik, Sean P. [4 ]
Ditto, Peter H. [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ So Calif, Dept Psychol, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[2] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY USA
[3] Univ Virginia, Dept Psychol, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
[4] Univ Calif Irvine, Sch Social Ecol, Irvine, CA USA
关键词
DISEASE-AVOIDANCE; SOCIAL COGNITION; NEURAL BASIS; DISGUST SENSITIVITY; MORTALITY SALIENCE; TERROR MANAGEMENT; LIBERALS; CONSERVATIVES; INTUITIONS; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MET) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter, we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory and detail the empirical findings that MET has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and moral psychology.
引用
收藏
页码:55 / +
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条