Transfer pricing in a multidivisional firm: A cooperative game analysis

被引：21
|
作者：
Leng, Mingming [1 ]
Parlar, Mahmut [2 ]
机构：
[1] Lingnan Univ, Fac Business, Dept Comp & Decis Sci, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] McMaster Univ, DeGroote Sch Business, Hamilton, ON L8S 4M4, Canada
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2012年 / 40卷 / 05期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Transfer price; Cooperative game theory; The core; Shapley value; SUPPLY CHAIN;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2012.04.009
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We consider the transfer pricing decision for a multidivisional firm with an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. The downstream divisions can independently determine their retail prices, and decide on whether or not they will purchase from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. To allocate the firm-wide profit between upstream and downstream divisions, we construct a cooperative game, show the convexity of the game, and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer prices for the firm. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：364 / 369
页数：6
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