Lessons from the Greek crisis

被引:35
|
作者
Tsebelis, George [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Polit Sci, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
Bargaining; constitutional rigidity; EU crisis; Greek crisis; nested games; veto players;
D O I
10.1080/13501763.2015.1087215
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
There are two features of the Greek crisis that need explanation: the lopsided outcome where Greece did not achieve any of its stated goals; and the protracted negotiations. I explain these two features as results of two factors: Nested Games (the Greek prime minister was also involved in a game inside his own party); and incomplete information (the Greek government did not understand the weight of unanimity to change the status quo in the EU, and did the best it could to create a unanimity, of all the other countries, against it). The lessons from the crisis are two-sided: for the Greek side not to lose any more time in the application of the agreements (say, with elections); for the EU side to consider different ways of forming and aggregating preferences: having elections (with a wide EU constituency as opposed to national ones), and making decisions (eliminating the unanimity requirement).
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页码:25 / 41
页数:17
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