Locke and Arnauld on Judgment and Proposition

被引:9
|
作者
van der Schaar, Maria [1 ]
机构
[1] Leiden Univ, Inst Philosophy, NL-2300 RA Leiden, Netherlands
关键词
D O I
10.1080/01445340801976532
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
To understand pre-Fregean theories of judgment and proposition, such as those found in Locke and the Port-Royal logic, it is important to distinguish between propositions in the modern sense and propositions in the pre-Fregean sense. By making this distinction it becomes clear that these pre-Fregean theories cannot be meant to solve the propositional attitude problem. Notwithstanding this fact, Locke and Arnauld are able to make a distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions (in their sense). The way Locke makes this distinction turns out to be very different from the way it is made by Arnauld.
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页码:327 / 341
页数:15
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