On sympathy: With other creatures (Humans and animals)

被引:0
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作者
Hacking, I [1 ]
机构
[1] Coll France, F-75231 Paris, France
[2] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
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中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Animal liberationists have increased our moral concern for animals, to the extent that many now think animals have rights. I am very cautious about the arguments of these philosophers, although I agree with many of their precepts. In this respect, I am aligned with the powerful essays of Cora Diamond. I argue that something like what Hume calls sympathy is essential for expanding circles of moral concern, and develop some Humean ideals. Sympathy with, and not simply sympathy for. Suffering is too narrow a range of concern. It is not as if the pain and pleasure of the utilitarians were the only ways in which we could be concerned with others. As Hume argued, animals share most human emotions, and it is through sympathy with the entire range that our worlds join. It is increasingly difficult for most of us to realize this, because human relationships with animals have changed since Hume's day. The multi-species barnyard has all but disappeared. We now live in a world of televised wilderness. To exaggerate, our species lives alone for the first time. Animal liberationists have the effect of enlarging our moral world, but should do so not just by attending to suffering or to rights of an animal, but to the whole creature, a being with which we can resonate.
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页码:685 / 717
页数:33
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