Optimal franchise contracts with private cost information

被引：15
|
作者：
Hempelmann, B [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Osnabruck, FB Wirtschaftswissensch, D-49069 Osnabruck, Germany
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2006年 / 24卷 / 02期
关键词：
franchising; two-sided incentives; private information; revelation principle;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper considers franchise arrangements in the case where the franchisee has private information about the marginal cost of sale. It is shown that the optimal contract in general leads to different margins for the parties than with common cost information. However, in special cases the same margins than with common cost information are optimal. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：449 / 465
页数：17
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Optimal taxation with private government information
    Sleet, C
    [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2004, 71 (04): : 1217 - 1239
  • [42] Dynamic optimal taxation with private information
    Albanesi, S
    Sleet, C
    [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2006, 73 (01): : 1 - 30
  • [43] Quality contracts with the supplier's private product manufacturability information
    Cao, Bin
    Gao, Jie
    [J]. COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, 2018, 125 : 309 - 318
  • [44] Capacity-Achieving Private Information Retrieval Codes With Optimal Message Size and Upload Cost
    Tian, Chao
    Sun, Hua
    Chen, Jun
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, 2019, 65 (11) : 7613 - 7627
  • [45] Capacity-Achieving Private Information Retrieval Codes with Optimal Message Size and Upload Cost
    Tian, Chao
    Sun, Hua
    Chen, Jun
    [J]. ICC 2019 - 2019 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC), 2019,
  • [46] OPTIMAL TIMING OF COST INFORMATION
    HUGHES, JS
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1975, 13 (02) : 344 - 349
  • [47] Optimal contracts for the agency problem with multiple uncertain information
    Wu, Xiaoli
    Zhao, Ruiqing
    Tang, Wansheng
    [J]. KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS, 2014, 59 : 161 - 172
  • [48] OPTIMAL-CONTRACTS WITH PUBLIC EX POST INFORMATION
    RIORDAN, MH
    SAPPINGTON, DEM
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1988, 45 (01) : 189 - 199
  • [49] Quantity flexibility contracts: Optimal decisions with information updates
    Sethi, SP
    Yan, HM
    Zhang, HQ
    [J]. DECISION SCIENCES, 2004, 35 (04) : 691 - 712
  • [50] Optimal contracts with team production and hidden information: An experiment
    Cabrales, Antonio
    Charness, Gary
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2011, 77 (02) : 163 - 176
12345