Optimal franchise contracts with private cost information

被引：15
|
作者：
Hempelmann, B [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Osnabruck, FB Wirtschaftswissensch, D-49069 Osnabruck, Germany
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2006年 / 24卷 / 02期
关键词：
franchising; two-sided incentives; private information; revelation principle;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper considers franchise arrangements in the case where the franchisee has private information about the marginal cost of sale. It is shown that the optimal contract in general leads to different margins for the parties than with common cost information. However, in special cases the same margins than with common cost information are optimal. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：449 / 465
页数：17
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