Balance or Collusion? An Empirical Study on Ownership Balance Mechanism in Equity Private Placements of Chinese Listed Firms

被引:0
|
作者
Gu, Hangyu [1 ]
Ruan, Yongping [1 ]
Zheng, Kai [1 ]
机构
[1] East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China
关键词
Private placements; Discount; Use of Proceeds; Ownership structure;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
We study how ownership structure affects agency problems in private placements and find evidence that the distraction of ownership structure is an effective way to reduce tunneling behaviors and protect minority shareholders in private placements. When majority shareholders subscribe securities in private placements, the offer price discount rises and more proceeds are used for capital operations. With the increase of equity balance, majority shareholders subscribe fewer securities in private placements, and even if they do subscribe, discount is lower and more funds are used for investment projects.
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页码:980 / 986
页数:7
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