The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability

被引:24
|
作者
Kimbrough, Erik O. [1 ]
Vostroknutov, Alexander [2 ]
机构
[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Dept Econ, Vancouver, BC V5A 1S6, Canada
[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
关键词
Cooperation; Common pool resource game; Rule-following; Experimental economics; PROPERTY RESOURCE; COOPERATION; NORMS; FIELD; COORDINATION; GAME;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeem.2015.04.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study a dynamic common pool resource game in which current resource stock depends on resource extraction in the previous period. Our model shows that for a sufficiently high regrowth rate, there is no commons dilemma: the resource will be preserved indefinitely in equilibrium. Lower growth rates lead to depletion. Laboratory tests of the model indicate that favorable ecological characteristics are necessary but insufficient to encourage effective CPR governance. Before the game, we elicit individual willingness to follow a costly rule. Only the presence of enough rule-followers preserves the resource given favorable ecological conditions. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:38 / 53
页数:16
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