A Wireless Spectrum Management Mechanism Based on the Theory of Double Auction in Cognitive Cellular Networks

被引:16
|
作者
Liu, Ya-Nan [1 ]
Wang, Xing-Wei [2 ]
Li, Jie [1 ]
Huang, Min [1 ]
机构
[1] Northeastern Univ, Coll Comp Sci & Engn, Shenyang, Liaoning, Peoples R China
[2] Northeastern Univ, Coll Software, Shenyang, Liaoning, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 美国国家科学基金会; 中国博士后科学基金;
关键词
Cognitive Cellular Network; 5G; Spectrum Resources; Cognitive Radio Technology; Double Auction; RADIO;
D O I
10.1145/3180496.3180601
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The fifth-generation Mobile Communication (5G) has a great advantage in addressing network transmission speed, data transmission quality, and system coordination functions(1). But with the rapid growth of mobile data traffic, the spectrum of resources in the cellular network cannot meet the needs of users emerged. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a cognitive cellular network oriented wireless spectrum management mechanism based on cognitive radio technology and the theory of double auction. The mechanism is based on the 5G scene and ideas, the introduction of macrocell and small cell joint deployment. We design a double pricing model to rent the idle resources to the cognitive users at a low price, and propose the idea of cognitive user classification before the allocation of resources. Aiming at high speed and low speed users, we design high-speed spectrum market game mechanism and low-speed spectrum allocation mechanism to determine the final spectrum allocation results and the calculation of the payment price. The simulation results show that the mechanism has good performance in terms of spectrum utilization, user satisfaction and request success rate. The mechanism is feasible and effective.
引用
收藏
页码:16 / 23
页数:8
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