Auction based game theory in cognitive radio networks for dynamic spectrum allocation

Cognitive radio is an emerging technology that has a high potential to deal with the scarcity problem in the radio spectrum. Dynamic spectrum access in cognitive networks enhances the efficiency of spectral utilization by cognitive users (unlicensed users). Auction mechanism approach helps the cognitive users to get a part of the unused license band, for a lease, from the primary users (licensed users). Based on the interference constraints, auction methods share the leased band to many cognitive users with negligible mutual interference. Because of this unique feature, the multi-winner auction is a fresh challenge to the existing auction mechanisms like (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) VCG and Second price auction. The proposed method uses interference-based constraints and satisfaction levels among the cognitive users to select the winner of the pricing based game. In this paper, a new framework plans to manipulate the multi-winner auction mechanism, based upon a pricing strategy to overcome the drawbacks of the traditional mechanisms. The proposed mechanism enhances the spectral efficiency of the cognitive users and also motivates the primary users to lease the bands to the cognitive users, with increased primary user revenue. Fairness among cognitive users ensures this mechanism. Simulation results show that our mechanism increases the spectral efficiency of cognitive users and the revenue of primary users. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.