Explaining Non-Take-up of Water Subsidy

被引:2
|
作者
Dahan, Momi [1 ]
Nisan, Udi [2 ]
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Publ Policy, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Harvard Univ, Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
water subsidy; take-up; information costs; administrative costs; HEALTH-INSURANCE; PARTICIPATION;
D O I
10.3390/w3041174
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
We use two separate quasi-natural experiments to explore the relative importance of information and administrative costs in explaining non-take-up of water subsidy. The first "experiment" shows that the take-up rate of a household with lower administrative costs is not significantly different from otherwise identical households. In contrast, using the same program, the second "experiment" reveals that the take-up rate of a household that is more likely to be informed is substantially higher compared to otherwise identical households. These findings support the idea that information plays a major role in explaining non-take-up of water subsidy.
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页码:1174 / 1196
页数:23
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