Information Asymmetry and Financing Decisions

被引:47
|
作者
Bessler, Wolfgang [1 ]
Drobetz, Wolfgang [2 ]
Grueninger, Matthias C. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Giessen, Ctr Finance & Banking, D-35390 Giessen, Germany
[2] Univ Hamburg, Inst Finance, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
[3] Univ Basel, Dept Corp Finance, Basel, Switzerland
关键词
TESTING STATIC TRADEOFF; CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS; PECKING ORDER MODELS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; EQUITY ISSUES; FIRMS; DEBT; DETERMINANTS; OWNERSHIP; DIVIDENDS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-2443.2010.01122.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study conducts tests of the pecking order theory using an international sample with more than 6000 firms over the period from 1995 to 2005. The high correlation between net equity issuances and the financing deficit discredits the static pecking order theory. Rather than analyzing the predictions of the theory, we test its core assumption that information asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions. Our empirical results support the dynamic pecking order theory and its two testable implications. First, the probability of issuing equity increases with less pronounced firm-level information asymmetry. Second, firms exploit windows of opportunity by making relatively larger equity issuances and build up cash reserves (slack) after declines in firm-level information asymmetry. Firms from common law countries use parts of their proceeds from an equity issuance to redeem debt and to rebalance their capital structure. These findings are consistent with a time-varying adverse selection explanation of firms' financing decisions.
引用
收藏
页码:123 / 154
页数:32
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