Independence and Transparency of the Central Bank of Kazakhstan

被引:0
|
作者
Nurbayev, Daniyar [1 ]
机构
[1] Kazakh British Tech Univ, Alma Ata, Kazakhstan
关键词
Kazakhstan; Central Bank; Legal Independence; Transparency; Central Banks Governor's Turnover; EVOLUTION;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
During the last two decades the idea that central bank independence and transparency helps to maintain price stability, became popular among economists and central bankers. Many countries' govemments give their monetary authorities higher independence and transparency to achieve the price stability goal. However, emerging countries such as Kazakhstan, suffer from high inflation. This inflation occurs largely due to a low level of independence and transparency of central banks. This research project measures the current level of independence and transparency of central bank of Kazakhstan. Indices were used to measure central bank independence and transparency. Central bank independence was measured by two types of indices: based on central bank laws (legal independence) and based on central banks governor's turnover (TOR). Developing countries have a weak legal framework, implying that a legal independence index cannot be appropriate to use as a measures of actual independence. Therefore, by paying attention to the other two indices, we can say that the central bank of Kazakhstan has alow level of independence and transparency. This, in turn, can be one of the causes of high inflation in Kazakhstan.
引用
收藏
页码:403 / 405
页数:3
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