Pay fairness and intrinsic motivation: the role of pay transparency

被引:33
|
作者
Hartmann, Frank [2 ]
Slapnicar, Sergeja [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ljubljana, Fac Econ, Ljubljana, Slovenia
[2] Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam Sch Management, Rotterdam, Netherlands
来源
关键词
distributive justice; fairness heuristic theory; intrinsic motivation; pay transparency; procedural justice; SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY; PROCEDURAL JUSTICE; ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE; SATISFACTION; BEHAVIOR; OVERPAYMENT; LEADERSHIP; OUTCOMES;
D O I
10.1080/09585192.2012.664962
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The fairness of managerial pay can be judged in terms of its distributive justice properties ('is my pay fair when compared to others') and its procedural justice properties ('is my pay fairly determined'). While both types of justice have been studied extensively in the organizational literature, their relative importance in predicting work-related outcomes is still open to debate. In this paper, we provide field evidence that the relationship between pay justice and managers' intrinsic motivation is moderated by pay transparency, which is the extent to which managers know each other's pay levels. In a homogeneous sample of 139 Slovenian bank managers, we find that procedural justice is a better predictor of intrinsic motivation when pay transparency is low, and that distributive justice is a better predictor of intrinsic motivation when pay transparency is high. These findings that are congruent with fairness heuristic theory (Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt and Wilke 1997a) suggest the importance of considering pay transparency for understanding and designing fair managerial pay systems.
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页码:4283 / 4300
页数:18
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