MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

被引:18
|
作者
Van Puyvelde, Stijn [1 ]
Caers, Ralf [2 ]
Du Bois, Cind [3 ]
Jegers, Marc [1 ]
机构
[1] Vrije Univ Brussel, Dept Appl Econ, Brussels, Belgium
[2] Hgsk Univ Brussel, Human Relat Res Grp, Brussels, Belgium
[3] Royal Mil Acad, Dept Econ Management & Leadership, Brussels, Belgium
基金
比利时弗兰德研究基金会;
关键词
Corporate governance; agency theory; stewardship theory; nursing homes; non-profit; CONJOINT-ANALYSIS; MIXED LOGIT; PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; STEWARDSHIP THEORY; CHOICE; AGENCY; GOVERNMENT; SERVICE; BOARD;
D O I
10.1080/14719037.2014.969760
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
By investigating managerial objectives, we test the simultaneous need for both control (agency theory) and collaboration (stewardship theory) in public and non-profit governance. We construct a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences of managers in Belgian public and non-profit nursing homes. The results confirm that boards of nursing homes may experience pressure to simultaneously control and collaborate with their managers, thereby suggesting that agency and stewardship theory can be combined into a more general internal governance framework. We conclude by providing some policy implications to improve public and non-profit governance.
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 237
页数:17
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