The Concrete Universal and Cognitive Science

被引:2
|
作者
Shillcock, Richard [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Edinburgh, Sch Philosophy Psychol & Language Sci, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ, Midlothian, Scotland
[2] Univ Edinburgh, Sch Informat, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ, Midlothian, Scotland
来源
AXIOMATHES | 2014年 / 24卷 / 01期
关键词
Abstraction; Abstract universal; Cognitive modelling; Complexity; Concrete universal; Simplicity; WORD RECOGNITION; MODEL; LANGUAGE; EMERGE;
D O I
10.1007/s10516-013-9210-y
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Cognitive science depends on abstractions made from the complex reality of human behaviour. Cognitive scientists typically wish the abstractions in their theories to be universals, but seldom attend to the ontology of universals. Two sorts of universal, resulting from Galilean abstraction and materialist abstraction respectively, are available in the philosophical literature: the abstract universal-the one-over-many universal-is the universal conventionally employed by cognitive scientists; in contrast, a concrete universal is a material entity that can appear within the set of entities it describes, of which it represents the essential, paradigmatic case. The potential role of concrete universals in cognitive science is discussed.
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页码:63 / 80
页数:18
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