No-regret dynamics in the Fenchel game: a unified framework for algorithmic convex optimization

We develop an algorithmic framework for solving convex optimization problems using no-regret game dynamics. By converting the problem of minimizing a convex function into an auxiliary problem of solving a min-max game in a sequential fashion, we can consider a range of strategies for each of the two-players who must select their actions one after the other. A common choice for these strategies are so-called no-regret learning algorithms, and we describe a number of such and prove bounds on their regret. We then show that many classical first-order methods for convex optimization-including average-iterate gradient descent, the Frank-Wolfe algorithm, Nesterov's acceleration methods, the accelerated proximal method-can be interpreted as special cases of our framework as long as each player makes the correct choice of no-regret strategy. Proving convergence rates in this framework becomes very straightforward, as they follow from plugging in the appropriate known regret bounds. Our framework also gives rise to a number of new first-order methods for special cases of convex optimization that were not previously known.