Moving target defense of FDIAs for battery energy storage systems in smart distribution networks

Accurate state of charge (SoC) estimation of battery energy storage systems is essential for ensuring the security, stability, and economy of smart distribution networks. However, SoC estimation is vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs). To address this challenge, this paper proposes an improved approach to moving target defense (MTD) that takes into account the grid-connected nature of the energy storage system. Specifically, we introduce perturbations to the reactance on the AC side of the battery energy storage systems and the inductance of the distribution network to enhance the traditional MTD. Furthermore, we design a cost-minimizing solution to mitigate the potential impact of MTD on the system. Our defense strategy considers the change in active power loss and the equipment operation cost as the system defense cost. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed method outperforms conventional MTD in IEEE13 and IEEE33 bus systems, with close-time usage, in terms of defense against FDIAs.