The Optimal Emission Reduction and Recycling Strategies in Construction Material Supply Chain under Carbon Cap-Trade Mechanism

As urbanization continues to expand in China, carbon emissions (CE) from the construction industry and the amount of construction and demolition waste (C & DW) are rapidly increasing. In order to reduce CEs and environmental hazards, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model to explore the evolution of carbon emissions reduction (CER) and recycling strategies in the construction material supply chain (CMSC) under the carbon cap-trade (C & T) mechanism. The monotonicity analysis on important variables and model comparison simulation are then conducted. The results show the following: (1) A contractor's green preference positively correlates with the CER level and recycling rate, while the CER cost exerts the opposite effect. (2) The C & T mechanism incentivizes low-emission manufacturers to actively participate in CER. However, excessive carbon trading prices may put high-emitters in a dilemma, making the whole supply chain profitless. (3) The recycler's decision to recycle C & DW tends to follow the manufacturer's CER decision. These findings not only help policy makers understand stakeholders' behavior in CMSC under C & T mechanism, but also provide a basis for the government to formulate CER policies and introduce low-carbon management.