Evolutionary game of stakeholders' behavioral strategies in wetland ecosystems from the vulnerability perspective

被引:4
|
作者
Mao, Qinghua [1 ]
Xu, Linyao [1 ]
Wu, Runwei [1 ]
机构
[1] Yanshan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Qinhuangdao 066004, Peoples R China
关键词
Wetland ecosystem; Stakeholder behavior strategies; Vulnerability; Complex network; Evolutionary game; Simulation analysis; ECOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY; MANAGEMENT; SELECTION; GREEN; MODEL; CONSERVATION; SYSTEM; CHINA;
D O I
10.1007/s11356-023-25300-5
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Wetland ecosystems have been seriously degraded by human activities and natural factors, and its restoration and coordinated development depend on long-term effective cooperation between the government and investors and providers. From the perspective of vulnerability of wetland ecosystem construction, this paper takes the government and investors, providers as the research object and propose a wetland ecosystem cooperation network, the article considers the "Matthew effect" of network connection and relationship cost, and uses the method of the evolutionary game on complex networks to construct the cooperative game model of wetland ecosystems. This research finds that (1) the vulnerability of wetland ecosystem varies greatly in different development stages, especially when the government subsidy coefficient for providers is reduced to 0.3, the vulnerability index is instead smaller. (2) The cooperative strategy adopted by investors can produce synergistic effect, which plays a major role in the healthy function of wetland ecosystem. (3) When the government subsidy coefficient for investors reaches 0.8, wetland ecosystem vulnerability shows a significant downward trend; when the provider loss coefficient reaches 0.8, wetland ecosystem vulnerability is significantly reduced and system stability is significantly enhanced. Thus, when the government actively promotes cooperation by adopting appropriate subsidies and regulation for investors and providers, the willingness of investors and providers to cooperate rapidly converges to 1, wetland ecosystem in vulnerability is at the lowest level. Finally, the findings combined with the numerical simulation analysis indicates that the importance of investors cooperating with the government in taking cooperative strategies actively, showing that stakeholder behavioral strategies can improve wetland ecosystem vulnerability. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the cooperation of wetland ecosystem stakeholders and a new direction for effectively reducing the vulnerability of wetland ecosystems and building efficient and benign wetland ecosystems in practice, which is of far-reaching significance for promoting wetland conservation management and an important reference value for wetland conservation planning, governance and improving the level of wetland conservation management.
引用
收藏
页码:43419 / 43439
页数:21
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