Is a fiscal union optimal for a monetary union?

被引:0
|
作者
Berriel, Rafael [1 ]
Gonzalez-Aguado, Eugenia [2 ]
Kehoe, Patrick J. [3 ]
Pastorino, Elena [4 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA USA
[2] Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
[3] Stanford Univ, Fed Reserve Bank Minneapolis, NBER, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[4] Stanford Univ, Hoover Inst, SIEPR, NBER, Stanford, CA USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Fiscal delegation; Fiscal federalism; Externalities; Public goods; European Union enlargement;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.11.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
When is a fiscal union appropriate for a monetary union? In a monetary union without fiscal externalities, when local fiscal authorities have an informational advantage over a central fiscal authority in terms of their knowledge of countries' preferences for government spending, a decentralized fiscal regime dominates a centralized one. Our novel result is that in the presence of fiscal externalities across countries, however, a decentralized fiscal regime is optimal for small monetary unions, whereas a centralized fiscal regime is optimal for large ones. These results shed new light on the debate on fiscal integration within the EU and its enlargement.
引用
收藏
页码:157 / 177
页数:21
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