Regulating Collusion

被引:1
|
作者
Chassang, Sylvain [1 ]
Ortner, Juan [2 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA USA
关键词
collusion; regulation; Twombly; burden of proof; safe tests; consent orders; artificial intelligence; CARTEL STABILITY; US INDUSTRIES; COMMUNICATION; COMPETITION; DETERRENCE; PUNISHMENT; DYNAMICS; BURDENS; PROOF; RISE;
D O I
10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We attempt to provide a systemic view of the process of regulating collusion, including detection and prosecution as well as bargaining between firms and regulators via consent orders, the production of evidence, and containment measures that may be taken if collusion cannot be addressed with more direct means. In addition, we try to do justice to the peculiarities of the legal system: Modeling the courts as they are, rather than as economists think they should be, is essential for economic analysis to improve the way collusion is regulated.
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页码:177 / 204
页数:28
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