City-State Ideological Incongruence and Municipal Preemption

被引:14
|
作者
Barber, Michael [1 ]
Dynes, Adam M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Brigham Young Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 745 Kimball Tower POB 25545, Provo, UT 84602 USA
关键词
REPRESENTATION; FEDERALISM; GRIDLOCK; CITIES; LAWS;
D O I
10.1111/ajps.12655
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
A growing concern among municipal officials across the United States is that their policymaking capacity is under attack by state legislatures who are increasingly likely to preempt those municipalities. However, determining the extent to which municipalities are preempted is challenging. We overcome this by surveying a large sample of municipal officials from across the United States. We find that officials from municipalities that are more ideologically distant from their state overall are more likely to report being preempted by their state government. Moreover, this pattern is driven by more liberal municipalities in both Republican and Democratic states reporting higher rates of preemption. Additionally, municipalities under unified state governments are more likely to report preemption, especially those under unified Republican control. These findings have important implications for the quality of representation in our federalist system and indicate that preemption is not just an issue between Republican states and liberal urban cities.
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页码:119 / 136
页数:18
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