Audit Partners' Role in Material Misstatement Resolution: Survey and Interview Evidence

被引:2
|
作者
Maksymov, Eldar [1 ]
Peecher, Mark [2 ]
Sutherland, Andrew [3 ]
Weber, Joseph [3 ]
机构
[1] Arizona State Univ, W P Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA
[2] Univ Illinois Urbana & Champaign, Gies Coll Business, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
[3] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA USA
关键词
financial reporting; auditing; material misstatements; restatements; internal controls; audit partners; earnings management; DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CLIENT MANAGEMENT; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; EQUITY INCENTIVES; NONRESPONSE RATES; QUALITY INSIGHTS; IMPACT; CONSEQUENCES; FREQUENCY;
D O I
10.1111/1475-679X.12506
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Auditors are expected to identify and resolve material misstatements (MMs) in management's financial statements. However, beyond the audit opinion, the audit process is opaque. To address this, we independently survey 462 audit partners and interview 24 audit partners, CFOs, and audit committee members on how partners assess and address MM risk, resolve MMs, and the consequences of MMs. Partners identify MMs in approximately 9% (15%) of public (private) engagements and use qualitative factors to waive apparent MMs. Loan covenant and going-concern issues increase MM risk more than earnings benchmark issues. Partners point to a variety of both auditor and client factors as threats to audit effectiveness. Partners often rely on rapport with management and involve the national office and audit committee in resolving MMs. Partner incentives around restatements are context specific. Our results provide new insights into the auditor's role in financial reporting that are relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators.
引用
收藏
页码:275 / 333
页数:59
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