Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?*

被引:13
|
作者
Ganong, Peter [1 ]
Noel, Pascal [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
来源
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 138卷 / 02期
关键词
STRATEGIC DEFAULT; NEGATIVE EQUITY; DETERMINANTS; FORECLOSURE; UNEMPLOYMENT; LEVERAGE; WEALTH; MODEL;
D O I
10.1093/qje/qjac040
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There are three prevailing theories of mortgage default: strategic default (driven by negative equity), cash flow default (driven by negative life events), and double-trigger default (where both negative triggers are necessary). It has been difficult to compare these theories in part because negative life events are measured with error. We address this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic-default motive. Our central finding is that only 6% of underwater defaults are caused exclusively by negative equity, an order of magnitude lower than previously thought. We then analyze the remaining defaults. We find that 70% are driven solely by negative life events (i.e., cash flow defaults), while 24% are driven by the interaction between negative life events and negative equity (i.e., double-trigger defaults). Together, the results provide a full decomposition of the theories underlying borrower default and suggest that negative life events play a central role.
引用
收藏
页码:1001 / 1065
页数:65
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