Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?*

被引:9
|
作者
Ganong, Peter [1 ]
Noel, Pascal [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
来源
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 138卷 / 02期
关键词
STRATEGIC DEFAULT; NEGATIVE EQUITY; DETERMINANTS; FORECLOSURE; UNEMPLOYMENT; LEVERAGE; WEALTH; MODEL;
D O I
10.1093/qje/qjac040
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There are three prevailing theories of mortgage default: strategic default (driven by negative equity), cash flow default (driven by negative life events), and double-trigger default (where both negative triggers are necessary). It has been difficult to compare these theories in part because negative life events are measured with error. We address this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic-default motive. Our central finding is that only 6% of underwater defaults are caused exclusively by negative equity, an order of magnitude lower than previously thought. We then analyze the remaining defaults. We find that 70% are driven solely by negative life events (i.e., cash flow defaults), while 24% are driven by the interaction between negative life events and negative equity (i.e., double-trigger defaults). Together, the results provide a full decomposition of the theories underlying borrower default and suggest that negative life events play a central role.
引用
收藏
页码:1001 / 1065
页数:65
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Why do borrowers default on online loans? An inquiry of their psychology mechanism
    Wang, Xiaolun
    Xu, Yunjie Calvin
    Lu, Tian
    Zhang, Chenghong
    [J]. INTERNET RESEARCH, 2020, 30 (04) : 1203 - 1228
  • [2] Why Do Borrowers Choose Adjustable-Rate Mortgages over Fixed-Rate Mortgages? : A Behavioral Investigation
    Mori, Masaki
    Diaz, Julian, III
    Ziobrowski, Alan J.
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE REVIEW, 2009, 12 (02): : 98 - 120
  • [3] Delinquencies, Default and Borrowers' Strategic Behavior toward the Modification of Commercial Mortgages
    Buschbom, Stephen L.
    Kau, James B.
    Keenan, Donald C.
    Lyubimov, Constantine
    [J]. REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, 2021, 49 (03) : 936 - 967
  • [4] First Mortgages, Second Mortgages, and Their Default
    James B. Kau
    Donald C. Keenan
    Constantine Lyubimov
    [J]. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2014, 48 : 561 - 588
  • [5] First Mortgages, Second Mortgages, and Their Default
    Kau, James B.
    Keenan, Donald C.
    Lyubimov, Constantine
    [J]. JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 2014, 48 (04): : 561 - 588
  • [6] Not if but when will borrowers default
    Banasik, J
    Crook, JN
    Thomas, LC
    [J]. JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY, 1999, 50 (12) : 1185 - 1190
  • [7] DEFAULT PROBABILITIES FOR MORTGAGES
    KAU, JB
    KEENAN, DC
    KIM, TW
    [J]. JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 1994, 35 (03) : 278 - 296
  • [8] Why Do Borrowers Make Mortgage Refinancing Mistakes?
    Agarwal, Sumit
    Rosen, Richard J.
    Yao, Vincent
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2016, 62 (12) : 3494 - 3509
  • [9] National Culture and Default on Mortgages
    Tajaddini, Reza
    Gholipour, Hassan F.
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, 2017, 17 (01) : 107 - 133
  • [10] PRICING DEFAULT RISK IN MORTGAGES
    EPPERSON, JF
    KAU, JB
    KEENAN, DC
    MULLER, WJ
    [J]. AREUEA JOURNAL-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE & URBAN ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION, 1985, 13 (03): : 261 - 272