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No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem
被引:0
|作者:
Levy, Neil
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Macquarie Univ, Dept Philosophy, Sydney, Australia
[2] Univ Oxford, Uehiro Ctr Pract Eth, Oxford, England
来源:
基金:
英国艺术与人文研究理事会;
关键词:
TRUST;
D O I:
10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8
中图分类号:
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号:
01 ;
0101 ;
摘要:
The novice/expert problem is the problem of knowing which apparent expert to trust. Following Alvin Goldman's lead, a number of philosophers have developed criteria that novices can use to distinguish more from less trustworthy experts. While the criteria the philosophers have identified are indeed useful in guiding expert choice, I argue, they can't do the work that Goldman and his successors want from them: avoid a kind of testimonial scepticism. We can't deploy them in the way needed to avoid such scepticism, because it would take genuine expertise to do so. I argue that attempts to deploy them in this sort of deep way involve a kind of transgression akin to, and at least as unreliable as, epistemic trespassing. We should give up trying to solve the novice/expert problem and instead promote better epistemic trust.
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