Impact of emotions on the behavioral strategies of PPP project stakeholders: an RDEU evolutionary game analysis

被引:1
|
作者
Bu, Zehui [1 ]
Liu, Jicai [1 ]
Liu, Jiaqi [2 ]
机构
[1] Southwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu, Peoples R China
[2] Southwest Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Mianyang, Sichuan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
PPP projects; Emotional factors; Public scrutiny; RDEU theory; Evolutionary games; SOCIAL-CONFLICT; GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION;
D O I
10.1108/ECAM-03-2023-0262
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
PurposeEmotions, understood as evolving mental states, are pivotal in shaping individuals"' decision-making, especially in ambiguous information evaluation, probability estimation of events, and causality analysis. Public-private partnership (PPP) projects represent a confluence of "economic-environmental-social" dimensions, wherein stakeholder behavior follows the sequential progression of "cognition-emotion-action." Consequently, comprehending the effects of emotional shifts on stakeholder's decision-making processes is vital to fostering the sustainability of PPP projects.Design/methodology/approachThe paper utilizes rank-dependent expected utility and evolutionary game theory to systematically examine the influence of emotional factors on stakeholders' behavior and decision-making processes within PPP projects. The paper integrates three emotional state functions-optimism, pessimism and rationality-into the PPP framework, highlighting the intricate interactions among the government, private sector, surrounding public and the media. Furthermore, the paper amalgamates the evolutionary pathways of environmental rights incidents with the media's role. Through equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, the paper delves into the diverse interplay of emotions across different phases of the environmental rights incident, assessing the impact of these emotions on the evolutionary game's equilibrium results.FindingsEmotions significantly influence the microlevel decisions of PPP stakeholders, adapting continually based on event dynamics and media influences. When the private sector demonstrates optimism and the surrounding public leans toward rationality or pessimism, the likelihood of the private sector engaging in speculative behavior escalates, while the surrounding public refrains from adopting a supervisory strategy. Conversely, when the private sector is pessimistic and the public is optimistic, the system fails to evolve a stable strategy. However, when government regulation intensifies, the private sector opts for a nonspeculative strategy, and the surrounding public adopts a supervisory strategy. Under these conditions, the system attains a relatively optimal state of equilibrium.Originality/valueThe paper develops a game model to examine the evolutionary dynamics between the surrounding public and private sectors concerning environmental rights protection in waste incineration PPP projects. It illuminates the nature of the conflicting interests among project participants, delves into the impact of emotional factors on their decision-making processes and offers crucial perspectives for the governance of such partnerships. Furthermore, this paper provides substantive recommendations for emotional oversight to enhance governance efficacy.
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页数:30
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