The nonlinear relationship between employee stock ownership plans and firm performance: Evidence from China

被引:4
|
作者
Dasilas, Apostolos [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Macedonia, Dept Appl Informat, POB 1591,156 Egnatia str, 54636 Thessaloniki, Greece
关键词
Employee stock ownership plan; Executive ownership; Employee engagement; Firm performance; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AGENCY THEORY; INCENTIVES; PRODUCTIVITY; MANAGEMENT; ECONOMIES; DIRECTORS; COSTS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.114470
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Two opposing forces (positive and negative) have been theoretically expounded to explain the relationship between employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and firm performance. However, the direction of this relationship remains a puzzle, especially in countries where state ownership is significant. This paper draws on the "Guidance on the pilot implementation of employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) by listed companies" issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to assess the moderating effect of state ownership on the relationship between ESOPs and firm performance. Using employee and executive stock ownership data from 620 Chinese listed companies between 2014 and 2020, I find an inverted U-shaped relationship between employee stock ownership and firm performance. However, the inverted U-shaped relationship holds only for non-state-owned Chinese firms. Finally, a U-shaped relationship between executive ownership and company performance has been found.
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页数:12
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