Deflating inflationism? Reflections on Douglas Edwards' The Metaphysics of Truth

被引：2
|
作者：
Wright, Crispin [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] NYU, Dept Philosophy, New York, NY 10012 USA
[2] Stirling Univ, Div Law & Philosophy, Stirling, Scotland
来源：
INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2023年 / 66卷 / 08期
关键词：
Alethic pluralism; deflationism; realism; objectivity; sparse and abundant properties;
D O I：
10.1080/0020174X.2022.2049528
中图分类号：
B82 [伦理学（道德学）];
学科分类号：
摘要：
I assess Edwards' two principal arguments against Deflationary conceptions of Truth and argue that neither is fully successful, then revisit the 'Inflationary' argument of chapter 1 of Truth and Objectivity. A case is outlined for a more variegated account of the opposition between realist and anti-realist views of different regions of thought than Edwards' account permits.
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页码：1463 / 1480
页数：18
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