Deflating inflationism? Reflections on Douglas Edwards' The Metaphysics of Truth

被引:2
|
作者
Wright, Crispin [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Dept Philosophy, New York, NY 10012 USA
[2] Stirling Univ, Div Law & Philosophy, Stirling, Scotland
来源
INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2023年 / 66卷 / 08期
关键词
Alethic pluralism; deflationism; realism; objectivity; sparse and abundant properties;
D O I
10.1080/0020174X.2022.2049528
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
I assess Edwards' two principal arguments against Deflationary conceptions of Truth and argue that neither is fully successful, then revisit the 'Inflationary' argument of chapter 1 of Truth and Objectivity. A case is outlined for a more variegated account of the opposition between realist and anti-realist views of different regions of thought than Edwards' account permits.
引用
收藏
页码:1463 / 1480
页数:18
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