Implications of risk aversion behavior on the green product promotion strategy under manufacturer encroachment

被引:5
|
作者
Hou, Pengwen [1 ]
Wang, Jun [2 ]
Zhang, Qian [2 ]
Zhang, Shuhua [1 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ Finance & Econ, Coordinated Innovat Ctr Computable Modeling Manage, Tianjin 300222, Peoples R China
[2] Tianjin Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Tianjin 300222, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Green product promotion; Manufacturer encroachment; Risk -averse behavior; Cost -sharing contract; CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN; CARBON EMISSION REDUCTION; CONSUMER SUBSIDIES; DEMAND UNCERTAINTY; COORDINATION; DECISIONS; QUALITY; POLICIES; IMPACT; PRICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2023.127911
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
This paper considers a supply chain in which a manufacturer produces green products and distributes through a physical retailer. The retailer would like to make promotional in-vestments to boost the market and the manufacturer determines whether to encroach the market directly. In the face of the channel competition and cannibalization, coupled with demand uncertainty, the retailer is considered to be risk averse and this attitude is mea-sured by the CVaR method. In particular, the impacts of manufacturer encroachment and cooperative advertising on supply chain participants' performance are explored. The results show that without cost-sharing contract, the manufacturer and the entire supply chain can benefit from the manufacturer's encroachment whereas the retailer always suffers. How-ever, the retailer's risk-averse behavior can alleviate the profit loss. Furthermore, we find that under the cost-sharing contract, both of the chain members can achieve pareto im-provement when the manufacturer encroaches the market. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:13
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