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Indirect Insider Trading
被引:2
|作者:
Goldie, Brad
[1
]
Jiang, Chao
[2
]
Koch, Paul
[3
]
Wintoki, M. Babajide
[4
]
机构:
[1] Miami Univ, Farmer Sch Business, Oxford, OH USA
[2] Univ South Carolina, Darla Moore Sch Business, Columbia, SC USA
[3] Iowa State Univ, Ivy Coll Business, Ames, IA 50011 USA
[4] Univ Kansas, Sch Business, Lawrence, KS USA
关键词:
INFORMATION-CONTENT;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
STOCK-PRICES;
PROFITS;
ASYMMETRY;
SECURITY;
RETURNS;
REFLECT;
MARKETS;
SECTION;
D O I:
10.1017/S0022109022001119
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Insiders must disclose indirect trades made through accounts they control, including family, trust, retirement, and foundation accounts. Indirect trades through these accounts are more profitable than direct trades in the insider's own account. They are also more likely to be made by "opportunistic " insiders who make nonroutine trades, or who trade profitably before earnings announcements, or who have a short investment horizon. These trades contain more predictive information about earnings surprises and large price changes, and they tend to be made by insiders at firms with high information asymmetry. Insiders also make fewer indirect trades following periods of intense regulatory scrutiny.
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页码:2327 / 2364
页数:38
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