Philosophical hermeneutics' problem of the method and its possible impact on natural sciences

For philosophical hermeneutics, understanding is a universal phenomenon, which, therefore, is not res-tricted to procedural rules or any method. However, the former faces a problem when, on the one hand, it pretends to be a non-methodical way of understanding and, on the other hand, at the same time, it defends some "rules" for a proper understanding. That said, this article aims to elucidate this ambiguity and to show some possible consequences. First, we briefly show the argument in defense of the universality of hermeneutics and, therefore, how the natural sciences would be implied by it. Next, we point to some of the normative aspects that seem to compose the understanding phenomenon, as presented to us by Gadamer. Finally, we conclude that a dialogue between philosophical hermeneutics and the natural sciences is necessary not only for interpretative purposes, overcoming possible conflicts and contradictions of this philosophy, but also for contributing to scientific activity in general, making it -perhaps -more conscious and vigilant about its historicity.