Active resilient defense control against false data injection attacks in smart grids

被引:1
|
作者
Luo, Xiaoyuan [1 ]
Hou, Lingjie [1 ]
Wang, Xinyu [1 ,2 ]
Gao, Ruiyang [1 ]
Wang, Shuzheng [2 ]
Guan, Xinping [3 ]
机构
[1] Yanshan Univ, Sch Elect Engn, Qinhuangdao 066004, Hebei, Peoples R China
[2] Jiangsu Collaborat Innovat Ctr Smart Distribut Net, Sch Elect Engn, Nanjing 636600, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[3] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Elect & Elect Engn, Shanghai 200240, Peoples R China
关键词
Active resilient defense; Attack detection; Cyber attacks; Cyber-attack detection; Cyber grid elements; Cyber threat; False data injection attack; Smart grids security; Interval observer; POWER; SYSTEMS; SECURITY;
D O I
10.1007/s11768-023-00141-2
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The emerging of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can fool the traditional detection methods by injecting false data, which has brought huge risks to the security of smart grids. For this reason, a resilient active defense control scheme based on interval observer detection is proposed in this paper to protect smart grids. The proposed active defense highlights the integration of detection and defense against FDIAs in smart girds. First, a dynamic physical grid model under FDIAs is modeled, in which model uncertainty and parameter uncertainty are taken into account. Then, an interval observer-based detection method against FDIAs is proposed, where a detection criteria using interval residual is put forward. Corresponding to the detection results, the resilient defense controller is triggered to defense the FDIAs if the system states are affected by FDIAs. Linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach is applied to design the resilient controller with H-8 performance. The system with the resilient defense controller can be robust to FDIAs and the gain of the resilient controller has a certain gain margin. Our active resilient defense approach can be built in real time and show accurate and quick respond to the injected FDIAs. The effectiveness of the proposed defense scheme is verified by the simulation results on an IEEE 30-bus grid system.
引用
收藏
页码:515 / 529
页数:15
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