Endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly under uncertainty

被引：4
|
作者：
Zhang, Yanfang [1 ]
Ji, Yuchang [1 ]
Tan, Qianwen [1 ]
机构：
[1] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Nanjing, Peoples R China
来源：
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 44卷 / 01期
关键词：
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION; COMPETITION;
D O I：
10.1002/mde.3675
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Including R&D risk, this paper considers the choices of R&D spillovers in a simple non-tournament cost-reducing R&D duopoly game with Bertrand competition. It turns out that the two firms never disclose any of their R&D information when considering their R&D non-cooperatively. However, if the firms decide their R&D cooperatively, we show, though they would always fully share their information when the risk of R&D is low, they would not disclose any of their R&D information when the market competition is fierce, the R&D risk is high and the R&D is efficient.
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页码：208 / 214
页数：7
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