Tribal coalitions and lobbying outcomes: Evidence from administrative rulemaking

被引:1
|
作者
Dwidar, Maraam. A. A. [1 ,3 ]
Marchetti, Kathleen [2 ]
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ, Dept Govt, Washington, DC USA
[2] Dickinson Coll, Dept Polit Sci, Carlisle, PA USA
[3] Georgetown Univ, Washington, DC 20057 USA
关键词
ORGANIZED INTERESTS; GOVERNMENT; DECISION; US; REPRESENTATION; ADVOCACY; BUSINESS; POLITICS; BEHAVIOR; OFFICE;
D O I
10.1111/psq.12843
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
American Indians are among the most underrepresented, yet heavily regulated, groups in national politics. While Indian nations maintain their status as sovereign governments, they, and their people, remain affected by national policies addressing their treaty, land, resource, and civil and political rights. Theories of American Indian political incorporation suggest that Indian nations thus deploy interest group tactics to maintain or achieve favorable policy outcomes. We argue that coalition building, a ubiquitous lobbying strategy, enhances tribal policy advocacy and that "Native-dominant" coalitions-those in which Native interests constitute a majority of members-are more influential than their non-Native-dominant counterparts. We test these claims using data from administrative rulemaking and find support for our hypotheses. We conclude that the unique particularities of tribal advocacy distinguish Native coalitions from those of other groups, and that their strategic lobbying choices may help to mediate representational disparities in policymaking by the executive branch.
引用
收藏
页码:354 / 382
页数:29
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