Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information

被引:0
|
作者
Einy, Ezra [1 ]
Haimanko, Ori [1 ]
机构
[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, Beer Sheva, Israel
关键词
Bayesian games; Bayesian potential; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Continuous payoffs; Absolute continuity of information; Purification; EXISTENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi -continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:341 / 347
页数:7
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